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Less than Bargained for:
The Use of Force and the Declining Relevance of the
United Nations
John C. Yoo* and Will Trachman**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of its intervention in Iraq, the United States is coming to terms
with an international system that may leave it open to serious national security
vulnerabilities. International terrorism, rogue nations, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction pose the threat of a direct, devastating attack on
American civilians. Regardless of one's opinion on the intervention in Iraq, it is
clear now that American policymakers must reevaluate their approach to the
United Nations as they develop a strategy to defeat these threats. International
lawyers must face the question whether the United Nations Charter, which seeks
to prohibit the use of force between nations in most instances,' too stricdy
constrains the behavior of the United States in responding to terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction, and rogue nations. If American policymakers reach a
consensus that important national security objectives are suffering because of
the United Nations, it will be difficult to justify adherence to the Charter rules
on the use of force.
Of course, no one seeks American withdrawal from the United Nations.
Even if United Nations membership ceased to accrue any significant security
benefits for the United States, a complete departure from the UN would be
unnecessary and unwise. The United Nations plays useful roles in encouraging
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United Nations Charter, art 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.").
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and enhancing international cooperation outside of the security area.2 US
withdrawal from the UN would likely trigger a spiral into collapse for the
organization, as occurred with the League of Nations after World War I. Indeed,
American absence from the League was one of several important factors that led
to its demise. 3 A similar collapse of the United Nations as an international body
would not be beneficial for the United States, even compared to the real
possibility that for most countries, membership in the UN may become
substantially less relevant to their respective security interests.'
The fact that complete US withdrawal is unlikely, however, does not mean
the United States must maintain its current relationship with the UN. Nor does
it mean that the United States cannot direct the UN to play a role more
consistent with its real abilities in the current security context. The US approach
of leveling heavy criticism eat the UN, its operations, and its members can be
supplemented by active steps toward its reform. This essay explores the proper
US approach to the UN with regard to the use of force.
This essay criticizes the United Nations Charter's standard for the use of
force, and outlines a different but still constructive role for the UN in some
critical domains. In Part II, we point to serious flaws inherent in the structure of
the United Nations Charter rules, particularly the ex ante requirements that
nations must satisfy prior to engaging in the use of force. Parts III and IV
suggest more modest types of roles that the United Nations could occupy, and
how the organization can help promote international security without
endangering the security interests of its respective members.
II. A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS'
GOALS AND STRUCTURE

Clearly, the United Nations' goals are admirable. Its twin aims are to
prevent the use of force between nations except in self-defense, and to promote
peace and international security by creating a system of collective self-defense in
2

3

4

Even when the UN is itself unable to react swiftly to international humanitarian crises, it does
seem to raise awareness of those crises in the international community. For an example of this
phenomenon in the continuing fight against HIV and AIDS, see David P. Fidler, Fightingthe Aas
of Illness:HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Poliy, 17 Harv Hum Rts J 99, 106-07 (2004).
Walter LaFeber, The Ameican Age: United States Foreign Poligy at Home and Abroad Since 1750, 350
(Norton 1989) (noting that the refusal of the United States and Great Britain to support the
League's "call to action" against Japanese incursions into China "mortally wounded" the League,
and caused it to "stumble ... slowly to its death.").

For a discussion of the similarities between the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well
as a predictive analysis of how the United Nations may adapt to modern warfare, see William C.
Bradford, 'The Duy to Defend Them": A NaturalLaw Justificationfor the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War,
79 Notre Dame L Rev 1365, 1463 (2004).
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which UN members-when authorized by the Security Council-resort to the
use of force to prevent threats to the international system. The Charter was a
response to World War II,5 which catalyzed the organization's development, and
which was characterized by sweeping conflicts between major alliances of
nation-states.6 In the United States, there was widespread sentiment after the
war's end that although American interests must always take precedence,
America could not afford to shun cooperation with other major global powers.
Charter passed overwhelmingly in the Senate by a vote of eighty-nine
The UN
8
to two.
In 1945, the UN Charter appeared to make a great deal of sense. In the
wake of World War II, the architects of the postwar international structure
sought to reduce the independent ability of states to make war. By encouraging
states to enter into collective security commitments to which many other states
were participants, future wars could theoretically be avoided.9 Eventually, global
problems generally-and not simply those dealing with the use of force between
nations-could be solved by an organization supported by intricate treaty
arrangements. At the same time, the Security Council created an institutional
forum in which the great powers (circa 1945) would continue to play an integral
role in collective security decision making. In this manner states could engage in
more mutually beneficial cooperation, and hopefully would not break their
respective bargains in order to go it alone in a dangerous world.
Today, however, the United Nations' rules on the use of force have
become obsolete. Some scholars have written that the Charter began its march
toward obsolescence soon after its initial conception. 10 It is no longer the Cold
War rivalry, however, that has rendered the Charter's use of force irrelevant. The
major threat to international peace and security today does not come from the
threat of conflict between great powers. Threats arise from international terrorist
5

6

7
8

9
10

The existence of a United Nations organization was famously discussed at the Tehran conference
in late 1943, where the leaders of the three major Allied Powers-Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Stalin-came to plan the closing phase of World War II. See LaFeber, The American Age at 403
(cited in note 3). For a general discussion on the emergence of the United Nations, see Douglas
Brinkley and Townsend Hoopes, FDR and the Creation of the U.N. (Yale 2000); Walter A.
McDougall, PromisedLand, CrusaderState 151-54 (Houghton Mifflin 1997).
For a summary of modem "just war" theory, and a comprehensive summary of the benefits that
states seek by joining the United Nations, see Joseph C. Sweeney, The Just War Ethic in International
Law, 27 Fordham Intl LJ 1865 (2004).
McDougall, PromisedLand, CrusaderState at 152-53 (cited in note 5).
Id at 153.
For a description of the path from World War II to the United Nations, see Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obgy InternationalLaw?,106 Yale LJ 2599, 2608-24 (1997).
Changing Norms Governing the Use
See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, Who KilledArticle 2(4)? or.
of Force by States, 64 Am J Ind L 809 (1970).

Winter 2005

Chicago Journalof InternationalLaw

organizations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and rogue nations.
In the modern era, the shift from conventional to unconventional warfare
compels us to question whether the UN's current approach continues to make
sense.
Does the emergence of modern terrorism signal the end of the usefulness
of the United Nations Charter's rules on the use of force? Certainly the
international landscape at the time of the adoption of the UN Charter was very
different than the landscape we face today. The UN Charter system was
designed to prevent future wars between great powers. World Wars I and II,
wherein large nation-states with huge mechanized armies invaded one another,
were the Charter's target. The Charter embraced an international system that
mirrors the criminal law-a system in which there would be a supranational
government that would attempt to hold a monopoly on the use of force. As with
domestic government, the UN would provide each nation security against attack
in exchange for its monopoly on the use of force. As with an individual under
domestic criminal law, a state cannot use force against another state, except in
self-defense. Just as one's personal response to an attack in self-defense is
justified in many domestic legal systems, a response in the international context
2
would similarly be justified by the system established by the UN Charter.
One of the most important reasons for distinguishing between domestic
criminal law and international use of force principles is the notion that, at some
level, there is an acceptable amount of conflict and harm in international
relations. Even where one nation's preemptive strike might add to the overall
level of conflict present in a given situation, international law permits nations to
act in a manner that could prevent imminent attacks. 3 Such actions, however,
may not always. be proportional to the threats would-be attackers present. In
contrast with domestic criminal law, it could be argued that states should have
flexibility when assessing the ability of others to cause harm, since it would seem
unfair to require states to respond with the precise amount of force necessary to
maintain the equilibrium of conflict and harm present in the world. Standard
criminal law does not always produce the same result. Individuals who defend
themselves must often be cognizant of the danger being posed to them. Indeed,
an individual may usually not use deadly force unless he reasonably believes such
11
12
13

See John C. Yoo, Using Force, 71 U Chi L Rev 729 (2004).
For a thorough analysis of the emergence of these analogous doctrines, as well as the inadequacies
inherent in drawing such an analogy, see id at 775-94.
Note that self-defense and preemptive attack are not synonymous. In self defensive actions, an
attack is occurring and the defender's actions are a response to that attack; in a preemptive attack,
a defender calculates ahead of time the risk involved in refraining from attack, and strikes first in
order to preclude the expected attacker from ever making the first move. For an analysis of these
concepts, see George P. Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw811 (Little, Brown 2000).
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force is necessary to protect his or her own life. For better or worse, we are
much more concerned about individuals who use deadly force than we are about
nations that must use an equivalent type of force to defend themselves.
Terrorist groups that wish to attack the United States are quite obviously
not restrained by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Private individuals and groups
are not bound by the terms of the Charter in attacking other states, but states are
bound by it when attacking nations they suspect sponsor and aid these groups. A
strict reading of the UN Charter-were it to actually have binding legal effect on
nations in their use of force-would significantly constrain the United States'
military options without producing any corresponding restraint on the part of
nonstate terrorist groups.
Nevertheless, some parts of the international community continue to
believe that a legitimate war may only be conducted either in self-defense or with
the express permission of the United Nations. UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, who recently called the conflict in Iraq "illegal," 14 is one of the more
prominent international figures to hold this belief. But his statement ignores the
multiple UN Security Council resolutions that authorized the use of force in
Iraq-authorizations that were never specifically repealed by the Security
Council."5 It also ignores legitimate self-defense claims by the United States. It
furthermore raises questions about the UN leadership's consistency in the
application of the use of force. During the Kosovo war, for example, the
Secretary-General did not raise loud objections to the legality of the intervention
by the United States and its NATO allies. Yet, that conflict was not authorized
by the Security Council, nor did the United States make any self-defense claim.
Like all international organizations, the United Nations seeks to facilitate
the bargains made between states. But the function of these organizations ceases
to be productive when nations feel a compelling need to consistently violate the
substantive norms embodied in the agreement. Whether international
organizations can successfully constrain member nations depends in part on
whether these nations receive a benefit from continuing to adhere to the bargain
established in the international agreement. A strict reading of the UN Charter
14

15

Colum Lynch, U.S., Allies Dipute Annan on Iraq War, Wash Post A18 (Sept 17, 2004). Annan is
officially on record as saying that the intervention in Iraq, "[flrom our point of view and the U.N.
charter point of view,.., was illegal."
See Michael D. Ramsey, Reinventing the Securioy Coundl: The U.N. as a Lockean System, 79 Notre
Dame L Rev 1529 (2004) (noting that the best argument in favor of those who feel preemptive
war against Iraq was consistent with the UN Charter is that Hussein continued to defy several
Security Council resolutions); see also Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a
Doctrine of Antidpatoy Counter-Terrorism, Counter-ProliferationIntervention, 15 Fla J Intl L 151, 187
(2002) ("Resolution 687 certainly was subsequent to Resolution 660, and it would be very difficult
to contend that the cease-fire resolution imposing an inspection regime is not also relevant to
Resolution 660, which authorized the initial use of force.").
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would prevent the United States from taking action to protect its national
security or to take steps to maintain international security. At some point, the
cost of the strict reading could outweigh the benefits that the United States
receives-or what the world receives from American uses of force that maintain
international peace and stability-from complying with the UN Charter. This
situation will either cause the United States to ignore the UN Charter rules,
replace them with new rules, or simply withdraw from the UN Charter system
entirely.
The case presented by Iraq demonstrates the costs of strict adherence to
the UN Charter in a world of new security threats. Although debate will
continue over whether Saddam Hussein could reasonably have been thought to
possess weapons of mass destruction or links to al Qaeda, it does seem clear that
the presence of Hussein's regime in the region was creating great instability.
Hussein had used the Iraqi army and military capabilities to wage several wars in
the region, including aggressive invasions of Iran and Kuwait. Hussein had also
caused billions of dollars in damage and killed thousands of civilians both in his
own and in neighboring countries.16 Only an expensive system
of military
7
check.'
in
instability
that
kept
sanctions
economic
containment and
Thus, if the UN Charter rules, as interpreted literally by Kofi Annan,
prohibited the use of force against Iraq in 2003, it would bar the United States
from taking action it believed necessary to prevent a threat to international peace
and security in that region. The United States went to war regardless of the
Secretary-General's interpretation of the Charter. One of three conclusions can
thus be drawn: the United States ignored the rules, it is seeking to change the
rules, or we are seeing the beginning of a US withdrawal from the UN Charter
system. To be sure, the withdrawal seems to be a gradual one, having begun with
the Kosovo war-another conflict waged by the United States and its allies in
violation of a strict reading of the UN Charter rules. Nevertheless, there would
be no reason for the United States to withdraw from the UN Charter if it could
more narrowly ignore or replace the Charter rules on the use of force only.
Those rules did not anticipate, and did little to constrain, the actions of the

16

For a more comprehensive description of the massive damage Saddam Hussein did to the region,

17

see Posteraro, 15 FlaJ Intl L at 156-69 (cited in note 15).
For the key findings of the commission charged with investigating the extent of Saddam
Hussein's weapons program, see Charles Duelfer, Regime Strategic Intent, Ky Findings 1, in

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, 30 September 2004, available
online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqwmd_2004/> (visited Nov 5, 2004) (finding
that "[b]y 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and
undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the
sanctons regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.").
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superpowers during the Cold War, and it appears that they will be similarly
irrelevant to the new post-September 11 security environment.
III. A REDUCED UN ROLE
Preventing the aggressive use of force between nations has always been the
primary purpose of the United Nations. Assessing whether it has achieved its
goal is a more difficult question. While its success at keeping peace may be
debated, it is certainly the case that the United Nations Charter's formal legal
rules are often breached. 8 By strictly confining the use of force to the point
where states must ignore legitimate security threats, the leadership of the United
Nations is condemning the Charter to obsolescence. States will change
international law before it becomes a suicide pact. 9 This is not to say, however,
that the United Nations can play no role in helping defuse militarized crises. The
UN might be more successful by creating mechanisms that help states resolve
international problems before they reach the stage of war. By fetishizing the use
of force requirements in the Charter, however, and neglecting to respond
aggressively to global threats before they become imminent, the UN has missed
an opportunity to maintain relevance in the security area. Recent UN efforts to
address proliferation or to operate sanctions regimes indicate that the UN is
currently unable to perform these potentially very useful tasks.
In addition to Iraq, another recent example may bear this out. The
International Atomic Energy Agency, an arm of the United Nations, adopted a
resolution on September 18, 2004, demanding that Iran freeze its uranium
enrichment operations. 2° Despite the demands of the UN, Iran has refused to
halt its nuclear weapons activities. Iran's plan to enrich more than forty tons of
uranium would, according to the Agency, provide enough material for several
nuclear bombs. Moreover, if the matter is sent to the Security Council for
review, Iran has stated firmly that it will withdraw entirely from the NonProliferation Treaty ("NPT").2' Although Iran contends that the uranium
enrichment operations are taking place solely for energy reasons, its Parliament
has suspiciously declared that it will not support additional NPT protocols that

18

That this is the case belies the notion that the Charter rules should be kept, even if ineffective,

19

merely to establish the "norm" of peace. See Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Aricle 2(4)
Are Greatly Exaggerated,65 AmJ Intl L 544 (1971).
See George Schulz, Low-Intensity Wafare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, Address before the Low-

20

Intensity Warfare Conference at the National Defense University (Jan 15, 1986), in 86 Dept of St
Bull 15,17 (Mar 1986).
Nazila Fathi, Iran Rebuffs U.N. Agency on Atom Issue, NY Times Al 5 (Sept 20, 2004).

21

Id.
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call for closer monitoring of weapons programs if the matter goes before the
Security Council.22
It appears to be increasingly the case that the UN Security Council will not
be able to take the measures needed to head off military conflict, whether in Iran
or elsewhere. This seems to be due, in part, to two different factors. First,
permanent members of the Security Council are likely to have differing interests
in different regions of the world, based on economic or political ties. In the
period leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, it became obvious
that France and Russia would vote against a new Security Council Resolution
authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein.23 Significant speculation
existed that these nations, each holding the ability to single-handedly veto a
potential resolution, might want to avoid war with Iraq so as to preserve
significant business contacts there or to ensure that the Hussein government
would repay its debts. In the case of Kosovo, Russia prevented the Security
Council from issuing a resolution authorizing the use of force because of its
historic ties to Serbia.
Second, permanent members of the Security Council may be using their
veto to frustrate the exercise of power by the United States. Some nations view
the United States as a global hyperpower that threatens to establish a worldwide
hegemony. They may seek to take measures to counteract the growth of the
United States in classic balance of power fashion. One way such countries may
seek to counterbalance the United States' enhanced position is by preventing the
Security Council from approving American interventions, thereby imposing
some political costs on its use of military force.
IV. WHAT ROLE IS LEFT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS?
The UN remains capable of playing a useful role in resolving disputes
between states before they escalate into warfare. Its role, however, is far more
modest than the ambitious goal of actually preventing interstate wars. Rather,
the United Nations can help reduce the chances of war between two nations by
playing the role of a neutral institution that can produce information about a
dispute. More information may help facilitate a bargain between the nations that
heads of war.
We might begin with a simple illustration. One puzzle is why two nations
with a dispute go to war at all. If two nations are in a dispute over something,

22

Id.

23

That France and Russia were the targets of Saddam Hussein's efforts to curry favor within the
Security Council to break the sanctions regime has been confirmed by the Duelfer Report. See
Duelfer, Regime Finance and Procurement,Ky Findings 1, in Comprehensive Report (cited in note 17).
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such as a piece of territory, then under perfect information they should come to
a settlement that divides the territory rather than going to war. War generates
costs that can be avoided by a peaceful bargain. In many cases, the sum of the
costs to the two nations may outweigh the sum of the benefits; in other words,
the destruction and loss of life from a war will far outweigh the benefit to the
two nations through a division of the disputed territory. Their division of the
territory should reflect their relative power positions. Thus, suppose state A and
state B both lay claim to a territory C. Suppose that state A's power is greater
than state B's, such that if a war erupts, state A will prevail and gain all of C.
However, a war would also generate costs on both sides. State A will presumably
go to war if the gains of war, namely the value of territory C, are greater than the
costs of war, which in part will be a function of the power of state B to resist a
military attack. If both states have full information about these costs and
benefits, it is likely that state A and state B will be able to reach a negotiated
settlement, rather than go to war.24 The resulting agreement would probably
divide territory C between the states such that A's share is greater than the
overall value of C minus the cost of war (which would be the overall cost benefit
of going to war). State B, behaving rationally, should make an offer that would
head off war, because it will otherwise suffer the costs of war and lose all of
territory C. The greater the power disparity between state A and state B, the
more that state B would be wise to offer, since even if it agrees to give most or
all of territory C, it still avoids the cost of war.
Rational states should reach an agreement rather than go to war. But as
James Fearon has observed,25 this is often not the case because states lack
perfect information of the relative capabilities and costs of war on the parts of
both states A and B.26 State A, for example, may not know exactly how much
power state B has, and it may not have good information on the costs of war to
state B. If it underestimates state B's power or overestimates the cost of war to
state B, state A will go to war in some situations when it should have actually
reached a negotiated settlement. State B, in other words, will have private
information about its own capabilities and costs that it may be unwilling to share
with A. State B, for example, might also want to exploit uncertainty about its

24

25
26

For a game theory analysis of war, see Eric A. Posner and Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal War andJus Ad
Bellum (April 2004), U Chi John M. Olin Law and Econ Working Paper No 211; U Chi Public
Law Working Paper No 63, available online at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
WkngPprs_201-25/211 .eap-as.optimalwar.pdf> (visited Oct 30, 2004).
James D. Fearon, Baqgaining, Enforcement, and InternationalCooperation, 52 Ind Org 269 (1998).
Defensive alliances also throw this equation into flux. For an analysis of this problem, see Posner
and Sykes, Optimal War, U Chi John M. Olin Law and Econ Working Paper No 211 (cited in note
24).
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capabilities and costs in the hopes that state A might do the exact oppositeoverestimate state B's power and underestimate its costs.
The UN could play a useful role in overcoming this problem and averting
war-not by forcing states to obey its formal legal rules, but by producing
2
information that causes states to alter their respective calculi of conflict. " If the
UN can provide more information to states about the relative power of nations
and the costs and benefits of conflict, it could help encourage negotiated
settlements. This function is consistent with theories about the role of
28
international institutions in facilitating bargains between member nations.
Transparency is one of the major assets produced by bargains between
states. Entirely apart from the United Nations, transparency is a bargaining chip
in negotiations between states that are party to GATT (and its successor, the
World Trade Organization), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
and other financial agreements.29 In certain circumstances, states may be willing
to provide transparency in exchange for increased information about the
capabilities and intentions of other states. We saw something like this at work in
the arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. What is less clear is whether states would be willing to
disclose information that could be given to potential opponents in a military
conflict, or to parties known for their inability to maintain confidentiality. Still, it
is possible that the United Nations could play a role to encourage all nations,
powerful or not, to maintain transparency.
To make this more concrete, the United Nations could produce
information by monitoring the development of weapons of mass destruction by
countries seeking to raise their international prominence by altering the balance
of power. Kenneth Abbott has suggested that nations contract with each other
3°
in order to open information channels that can help achieve security interests.
When such agreements first began to appear in the Cold War period, nations
sought to contract in order to either limit arms races or to disarm. Formal
agreements, like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ("START") and Strategic
27

28

29
30

See William J. Aceves, Institutionafist Theory and InternationalLegal Scholarsh, 12 Am U J Intl L &
Poly 227 (1997) (describing theories of international legal scholars and detailing the shift from an
anarchical international order to an atmosphere where states bargain with one another to enhance
their own interests).
Fearon, 52 Ind Org at 269-70 (cited in note 25) (noting that institutions devoted to facilitating
bargaining are just as important to international cooperation as those focused on enforcement and
monitoring).
William B. T. Mock, An Interdisciplinagy Introduction to Legal Transarency: A Tool for Rational
Development, 18 Dickinson J Ind L 293, 295 (2000).
Kenneth W. Abbott, 'TrustBut Veifi'" The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other
InternationalAgreements,26 Cornell Intl LJ 1 (1993).
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Arms Limitation Talks ("SALT") agreements, succeeded in achieving this goal.
But when the most pressing current danger is the threat of international
terrorism and rogue nations, major agreements such as START and SALT are
less important-the problem is not arranging reciprocal arms reductions
between equally armed superpowers. Information could still be useful, however,
by assuring nations that its intentions and capabilities are not hostile. Iraq
highlights that nations will be uncertain about the intentions and capabilities of
rogue nations that might be developing weapons of mass destruction or might
be harboring hostile terrorist organizations. More uncertainty about the rogue
nation may have the effect of forcing larger nations to attack in order to prevent
the development of a situation in which weapons of mass destruction fall into
the hands of terrorists. While this may seem to be counterintuitive, rogue
nations may benefit from producing information to a neutral third-party, such as
the United Nations. That information may reassure suspicious nations that the
rogue nation does not intend to develop weapons of mass destruction and is not
harboring terrorists.
Verification arrangements tend to fulfill the interests of multiple
contracting parties by ensuring that no party is cheating on international
agreements to the detriment of other nations. 3 In some types of verification
arrangements, each state party uses its own efforts to monitor the other parties'
compliance within an overarching international agreement. Since states that
behave rationally can be expected to pursue their own interests stealthily, they
cannot always be trusted to unilaterally provide reliable information to other
parties. The best arrangements thus allow states to retain their own respective
information gathering capabilities, 3 2 in order to ensure that other states are
adhering to the bargain. Of course, some international agreements will be
between parties of asymmetrical ability to gather information.33 In this regard,
the UN could play an especially important role as a facilitator of comprehensive
transparency arrangements, and could perhaps reduce the asymmetry inherent in
most arrangements. Ideally, the UN could simultaneously attempt to maximize
information collection while preserving a sphere of autonomy for individual
states. Such agreements could enhance security for all parties and might have the
concomitant effect of engendering a sense of autonomy that is only as limiting
as it is for all the parties involved.

31
32

33

Id at 17-20.
Indeed, nations would seem to be acting irrationally if they were to join arrangements in which
they did not retain inspection power over the other parties to an agreement. See id at 17.
Id at 57 (noting that smaller countries have trouble monitoring large countries with vast
weapons supplies).
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Iraq provides a case in point. The UN inspection teams ("UNMOVIC")
sought to provide more information about Iraq's capabilities, particularly
whether it had weapons of mass destruction. If the inspectors had not met with
obstacles and frustrations, it might have revealed whether Iraq ultimately had
Weapons of Mass Destruction ("WMD"). By appearing to delay and impede the
inspections, however, Iraq created uncertainty about its true capabilities and the
costs of war.34 Attempting to frustrate the weapons inspectors, for example, may
have created the impression that Iraq was near to completion of a viable WMD
system. That would have encouraged war, rather than led to a negotiated
settlement.
Of course, agreements would not solve all security problems. These
agreements would still fail to prevent individual terrorists who are not receiving
support of states to operate. But they would allow one country to know whether
other countries are or have the capability of supporting terrorists, or whether
they are developing weapons of mass destruction that they might pass on to
terrorists. Largely for this reason, the blame for US intervention in Iraq must
primarily lie with Saddam Hussein. The unwillingness of the Hussein regime to
allow an independent monitoring and verification of its activities led directly to
US concerns that the regime posed an imminent threat to its security.
Saddam Hussein's refusal to allow surprise inspections, as well as free and
unfettered access to various weapons facilities, reinforced growing concern
among American policymakers that the Hussein government posed an imminent
threat to the United States. Although Hussein may not have developed the
capability to launch a nuclear attack against the United States,3" the possibility
that he had WMD raised legitimate fears that he might use them to alter the
balance of power in the oil-rich and strategically important Middle East, or that
he might transfer them to terrorist organizations. Swift and definitive weapons
inspections could have revealed the private information that Iraq did not possess
WXMD, if indeed that were the case, to the United States and its allies. But active
resistance to the inspections had the opposite effect, magnifying the possibility
that Iraq possessed a WMD program and stockpile.
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The Bush Doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is a response to the
uncertainty concerning the status of WMD held by rogue nations. It is certainly
possible that Hussein stonewalled the United States and United Nations out of
principle or even mere pleasure. Nonetheless, it appeared Hussein was doing his
best to hide a substantial weapons program. It would have approached
irrationality to hope that the Hussein weapons program would remain dormant
or less than threatening for very long.
In the context of the post-September 11 environment, it was particularly
problematic that Hussein, the leader of a state that had destabilized the Middle
36
East several times prior, possessed known financial connections to terrorists,
and had served as a constant threat to regional peace,37 would continue to
frustrate UN weapons inspections. Hussein himself must be seen as responsible
for sparking a decline in the relevance of the United Nations. Had unfettered
access been given to UN weapons inspectors, it is unlikely that the United States
would have continued to be so anxious about the possible threat Iraq posed.
That Iraq would not reveal its capabilities was particularly problematic after
September 11, which demonstrated that an attack on the United States could
take unconventional yet devastating forms.
Even if Iraq were less than a temporally imminent threat in March of 2003,
the passage of time could easily have altered its status. Within a few years,
Hussein's weapons program could have advanced to the point where preemptive
attack would have been unfeasible. Indeed, it appears that Hussein was actively
planning on using chemical weapons on American troops. The fact that he did
not appear to possess these weapons at the time of the Coalition's intervention
was used by many commentators to suggest that the war was unjustified. 38 But
unless the United Nations could have verified that such weapons would not
have been developed in the short term, the intervention might have been
justified on the grounds that Hussein appeared to possess a growing WMD
stockpile that could easily become an imminent danger to the United States.39
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Altering the current international understanding of the term "imminence"
is therefore critical. The standard that we adopt for the term must not be so
constraining as to invite its breach-either by the United States, or by other
nations that in the near future also find themselves anxious about potential
terrorist attacks.40 This standard could provide benefits in the way we think of
terrorism and rogue states. Terrorism undermines the imminence standard
because states may have no warning of an imminent attack from a terrorist
organization. In the case of international terrorism of the kind we witnessed on
September 11, 2001, a nation might have information about locations of terrorist
personnel or assets, but at a time that is distant from the time of an actual attack.
Terrorists, as we saw with al Qaeda, carry out attacks by surprise with individuals
disguised as civilians attacking civilian targets. In such circumstances, the
imminence standard simply does not permit a nation to use force within the
available window of opportunity when that force could prevent the attack.
Understanding that the imminence standard has changed helps us to
understand the war in Iraq. One of the problems with Iraq is that it potentially
threatened not just to develop weapons of mass destruction, but also to secretly
proliferate them to other nations and groups that might be hostile to the United
States. Again, the imminence standard is very difficult to apply because a
proliferator might not necessarily pose an imminent threat of attacking the
United States, but could be passing on weapons to people or groups who would
use them. The window of opportunity in which to attack the proliferators, and
not those who would actually use the weapons, might be exceedingly small.
The Hussein regime succeeded, to its detriment, in defeating international
efforts to neutrally verify its WMD capabilities, and thereby provide more
information that could have given other nations the ability to more accurately
estimate the threat that Iraq posed to international peace and security. By raising,
in the minds of the United States and its allies, serious concerns about its
evasiveness, and the risk of regional and international instability, Hussein left the
Coalition with few options. Perhaps after Iraq we will witness more cooperation
between countries because it will be in their interest to cooperate with UN
verification teams. Cooperation with international efforts to produce
information about a nation's WMD capabilities will actually do more to reassure
other countries, such as the United States, that may be willing to use force to
prevent their possession by rogue nations or terrorist organizations. If the UN
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or other international institution can provide a verification framework, it can
help provide an international public good: information that a nation is not
developing prohibited WIMD that could cause a threat to international peace and
security.
So long as countries are convinced that sufficient transparency has been
achieved, they can make more accurate judgments about threats and capabilities.
This could reduce the amount of wars that occur because of mistake or
misunderstanding. The exchange of information, entirely apart from the ensuing
transparency it allows, would also likely enhance relations between nation-states.
If the UN's role were limited to facilitating these interstate agreements by
monitoring weapons programs, it could continue to play a useful role in
reducing international conflict. The UN's problem has been its overly ambitious
goal of stopping all interstate conflict through the imposition of a strict, formal
prohibition on the use of force.
The last point regarding the UN Charter system and its provision of
collective goods involves the potential roles that international institutions can
play. International institutions still could play a very important role in the
relations between nations because they could provide, as we think the UN
verification teams sought to do in Iraq, neutral information about whether a
country creates a threat to international stability. Unfortunately, Saddam
Hussein's policies in Iraq-not just resisting verification efforts but also
continuing to develop WMD-shows that certain kinds of interventions may
continue to be justified.4
But as long as defenders of the United Nations Charter refuse to take into
account the magnitude of a potential attack, and continue to rely on a temporal
imminence standard, the Charter will continue to decline in relevance. No state
will, at least in the long run, jeopardize its national security by limiting its use of
force against individual terrorists or rogue nations until they are just about to
launch an attack. Full-scale wars between large industrialized nations appear to
be on the wane. It is much more likely that small, but highly dangerous weapons
in the hands of terrorists or rogue nations will pose a greater threat to legitimate
security interests than the Great Wars of the early twentieth century. To remain
relevant and useful to its member states, the United Nations must reduce its
ambitions and play a more modest role in reducing international conflict.
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V. CONCLUSION

The goals of the United Nations are admirable, and provide the backdrop
for a meaningful framework of international cooperation. However, states are
not receiving the full benefits of their bargains. Indeed, at this point, they are
being unnecessarily constrained from answering genuine threats to their national
security. Before the UN Charter's rules governing the use of force fade into
obscurity, we must reevaluate the UN's role. Modern warfare demands that
states enjoy more flexibility in the use of force than that permitted by a strict
reading of the UN Charter's rules. It is time that the United Nations recognizes
the reality of the international situation, and that states demand a better bargain.
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